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THE POLITICAL EVOL UTION OF 
INTELLIGENCE 
BY STEPHEN BOWERS 
While recent attention has been focused on the sensational aspects of 
intelligence work, it is the mundane uses of intelligence which have 
most increased in importance. A broader conception of politics, 
coupled with an application of technologically advanced military 
equipment, the expanding role of high technology industries, and 
improved methods to obtain intelligence data have all contributed to 
an enlarged role for intelligence. To understand the significance of the 
contemporary role of intelligence, one must trace the development of 
the art. 
Intelligence dates back to the beginning of mankind. Primitive man 
sought answers to questions relating to his survival and comfort. He 
wanted to know what his enemies were doing and how their threats 
could be met. Where could he find food and shelter? With his limited 
understanding of the world around him, these matters strained the 
limits of his knowledge. As society developed, there was a division of 
responsibilities and the appointment of intelligence 'officers'. Yet these 
first intelligence operatives lacked even the most rudimentary technical 
sophistication and, as often as not, turned for assistance to mysticists 
who presumably had gifts enabling them to 'see' into the future and so 
help heads of state. 
The systematisation of mysticism occurred in China around 1200 
BC with the appearance of The Book Of Changes or, as it is also called, 
I Ching. This work, a collection of mystical, cabbalistic teachings, 
served for centuries as an instructional guide for spies. While offering 
no direct answers, it was believed to provide, with the appropriate 
ritualistic incantations, important clues which the decision-maker could 
decipher. 1 
Early Greek intelligence likewise relied upon the supernatural. 
According to mythology, Cassandra, the daughter of Priam of Troy, 
received the gift of prophecy from the god Apollo with instructions 
that she use it to help her people. The Greeks assumed that the gods 
themselves provided intelligence - frequently in the form of riddles -
to assist in the formulation of political or military strategy. Yet, whiL: 
the warnings of the Delphic oracle eventually became less supernatural, 
they continued to be painfully unscientific and unreliable. 
Biblical records note the application of intelligence to political and 
military problems of the time. For example, Numbers recounts God's 
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instruction to Moses to send men into Canaan in order to learn what 
riches the land offered and what enemy forces would be encountered in 
Canaan. Their assignment was the most basic of the intelligence tasks -
simple reconnaissance, a report of what was seen and no more. 
THE SOPHISTICATION OF INTELLIGENCE 
In 480 BC the Emperor Xerxes captured three Greek agents sent to 
spy on his troops. Xerxes ordered that the three be allowed to view his 
impressive array of forces and then return to the Greek army. His plan, 
obviously, was to deter his enemies from attacking by convincing them 
of his invincibility. Contemporary practices of allowing some espionage 
against one's forces are a reflection of this early psychological ploy. 
Unfortunately, this gamble did not work for Xerxes but simply enabled 
the Greeks to be better prepared for Xerxes' large force. The transition 
from simple reconnaissance to modern intelligence was also aided by 
Xerxes' attempts to analyse the behaviour of Greek soldiers in order to 
detect exploitable weaknesses. This is the first recorded instance of the 
employment of analysts to explain foreign behaviour.2 
The continued subordination of intelligence to military needs as 
well as the increasing sophistication and glorification of intelligence 
work is illustrated by the writings of Sun Tzu, a contemporary of 
Confucius and author of Principles Of War. Sun Tzu provides the first 
recorded effort to examine the intelligence process systematically and 
intellectually while developing principles and systems of espionage. He 
offered lessons on the functions and techniques of these systems, 
institutions primarily of the East, the region in which the spy's mission 
and importance were first recognised. Leaders of the different Chinese 
kingdoms, Sun Tzu explained, emphasised the necessary association of 
intelligence with military endeavours and stimulated its advancement 
far beyond simple reconnaissance. Deception had become a hallmark of 
intelligence as spies wearing enemy uniforms infiltrated adversary's 
camps. Exposed agents were allowed to continue their missions while 
authorities provided them with misleading information. Sun Tzu 
suggested that an even better course would be to win the allegiance of 
captured spies by generous treatment and then dispatch them back to 
their former masters as conscious agents of a new master. Sun Tzu 
wrote that the spy should enjoy a privileged position. No honour, he 
insisted, was too great for these heroic figures, a sharp contrast to the 
prevailing modern Western view of spies as contemptible individuals 
whose existence should, if possible, be denied. He also delineated cate-
gories of spies and gave detailed instructions on the employment of 
each. In view of the value of espionage in defending the nation against 
war and in waging war economically if it came, Sun Tzu called for a 
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permanent espionage service to tell leaders about all foreign develop-
ments.3 
INCREASED DEMANDS ON INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS 
The changing conditions of military campaigns led to increased 
demands on intelligence operatives. Knowledge of languages, dialects, 
and customs became vital to the success of intelligence. Master strate-
gists such as Hannibal recognised this through bitter experience, such as 
his unfortunate campaign in southern Italy where he instructed his 
guides to take him to Casinum. Hannibal's poor command of the 
guides' language resulted in a misunderstanding and they took him to 
Casilinun instead of Casinum resulting in near disaster. Mithridates, on 
the other hand, was a master of twenty-two languages and always 
understood local tribes and their customs. His thorough training 
enabled him to enjoy great success in his rivalries with the Romans. The 
Romans long suffered from a self-imposed handicap in that espionage 
was originally rejected by their leadership. Both Tiberius and Julius 
Caesar opposed the establishment of a secret service: the existence of 
, .. 4 
one might have prevented Caesar s assassmatlon. 
Failure to understand the culture and customs of the East led to 
mistakes by European leaders during the Middle Ages. They knew little 
of the Byzantine Empire, the Eastern Slavs, or the Muslim peoples. 
Efforts to make contacts with these civilisations were branded as 
'heresy'. 
POLITICAL ADAPTATIONS OF INTELLIGENCE 
The next phase in the evolution of intelligence saw commercial 
activities used for espionage with an increasingly political overtone. 
European ignorance of the East was reduced by commercial ventures in 
that region. European political leaders, however, did not immediately 
utilise the knowledge placed at their disposal by ambitious merchants. 
It was not until the fifteenth century that the Italians realised the folly 
of isolating political intelligence operatives from commercial operatives 
and established embassies and missions in foreign states, a new practice 
.. 5 
soon adopted by other European ImItators. 
By the time of the Hundred Years' War, espionage was having a 
maj or impact on political and military affairs. The English, unable to 
defeat the French forces inspired by Joan of Arc placed a covert agent 
among the French clergy who organised a plot which eventually led to 
the death of Joan of Arc. This significant event illustrated the link 
between information and action and also demonstrated the application 
of politically based intelligence.6 
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THE DOMESTIC FUNCTION OF INTELLIGENCE 
With the application of intelligence to political concerns of an 
international character came intelligence systems for maintenance of 
domestic political control. If it was important to know what a foreign 
adversary was planning, it was equally vital to know about one's 
domestic rivals. By 1600, the Japanese Shogun Yeyasu had established 
a domestic espionage network to watch provincial governors. This 
system operated through Y eyasu's personal followers who commanded 
spies positioned throughout the nation. Even more extensive was the 
earlier Chinese family spy system of the tenth century AD by the 
emperor's Privy Councillor, Wang An-shih. At the time, the country was 
plagued by banditry and Wang decided that only a comprehensive spy 
system could help. Under his system, families were organised into units 
of ten, fifty, and five hundred with all family members responsible for 
the crimes committed by other members or relatives and guests visiting 
in their homes. Citizens were required to report on good as well as evil 
deeds. Wang's family spy system became a model for future regimes, 
including that of Mao Tse-Tung. 7 
Intelligence had expanded beyond 'battlefield' intelligence, linking 
information with action, developing political intelligence and organising 
domestic security. Application of intelligence to state service was the 
most significant step, however, in establishing specific, identifiable 
users of intelligence with overt political interests and requirements. 
The Egyptians and the Italians did much to develop the practice but 
the contributions of Sir Francis Walsingham and Joseph Fouche were 
vital. Walsingham established the first modern political espionage 
system that gave open service to the state. The political spy system 
which he set up for Queen Elizabeth I employed almost every 
technique of espionage: his organisation combined the domestic and 
the international. It dispatched students from Cambridge University 
in an effort to penetrate the French court; the plot involved the poet 
and dramatist Christopher Marlowe whose mysterious death some 
believe was connected with this undertaking. Walsingham's system is 
credited with defeating the French-backed conspiracy to elevate Mary 
Queen of Scots to the English throne and procuring the naval intelli-
gence that enabled England to destroy the Spanish Armada.8 
Joseph Fouche organised Napoleon's secret political police and 
counterespionage machinery. Unlike Walsingham two hundred years 
earlier, Fouche was not involved in the collection of military and 
foreign intelligence. The primarily domestic political concern of the 
French organisation continued even after Fouche's departure. By this 
time, recognition of the importance of intelligence had led most 
European nations to develop improved intelligence operations. Sweden 
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and Holland became the premier examples of small states which 
enjoyed prominence because of outstanding intelligence systems. 
The Swedes used religious connections to recruit foreign nationals for 
Swedish espionage. Such religious recruitment was a precursor of 
Soviet ideological recruitment in the name of Marxism-Leninism.9 
INTELLIGENCE IN SERVICE TO THE STATE 
The art of intelligence was to advance rapidly under state tutelage. 
Intelligence technology benefitted from generous state funding; legal 
support made possible the application of new information-gathering 
devices and the recruitment of the best personnel. State interests 
demanded the extensive development of counter-intelligence or 
counter-espionage. Britain's passage of the Official Secrets Act of 1889 
was the first significant legal expression of the need to make systematic 
efforts to protect the information of the state. This law was not only 
the product of Victorian military devices, but also came about as a 
result of numerous scandals in England in 1888 involving officials who, 
for various reasons, shared information with foreign military represen-
tatives. The development of weaponry by private interests made super-
vision of security difficult and the Official Secrets Act was an 
h ' 10 important effort to protect testate s secrets. 
The Act helped resolve long controversies about what could and 
could not be properly disclosed or shared by making criminal the com-
munication of any defence information to foreign representatives. 
Additional legislation dealt with giving secret information to news-
papers. A more stringent Secrets Act was passed in 1911 in response to 
widespread concerns about the success German agents were allegedly 
enj oying. Open foreign efforts to recruit individuals who had worked 
on classified British military projects - such as the placing of advertise-
ments in newspaper by agencies of the US government - underlined the 
need to do more to protect British security. 
INTELLIGENCE DURING WORLD WAR TWO 
It was not until nearly the middle of the Second World War that the 
United States joined the British in development of a coherent system 
for production of systematic intelligence. The creation of the Office of 
. 11 k 12 I h h S . U' Strategic Services IS we nown. t was now t at t e OVlet 1110n 
improved its intelligence to a point so their operations were comparable 
to those of the British and the Americans in terms of the committed 
resources and efforts.13 
Pearl Harbour did the most to stimulate American efforts to 
establish an effective intelligence system. In early 1942 there was 
recrimination and hints of espionage which led Congress to mount an 
172 
THE POLITICAL EVOLUTION OF INTELLIGENCE 
investigation to fix responsibility. It became evident that documents 
had crossed the desks of many US officials. Many of them with proper 
analysis, would have indicated the strong likelihood of a Japanese 
attack. Congressional summaries declared that it was not treason or 
ineptitude but the lack of a coordinated system for gathering and 
evaluating information on Japanese military, political, social, and 
economic developments that made the disaster at Pearl Harbour 
possible. This set the stage for the creation of a centralised intelligence 
agency to replace the various departmental operations. 
A problem during the early years of the war was the almost 
complete absence of cooperation between the British and American 
intelligence agencies. The job of establishing an unofficial relationship 
between British and American services fell to Canadian businessman 
William Stephenson. His travels as a businessman convinced him tha~ 
the Germans were building an armaments industry that would threaten 
Britain, a view rejected by most in the British government. Recognising 
Stephenson's skill and perception before the war, Winston Churchill 
turned to Stephenson after the war began, asking the Canadian not only 
to conduct propaganda for the British in the United States, but also to 
work out an arrangement with the Americans for intelligence sharing. 
As a result of his success in approaching the FBI, J. Edgar Hoover 
designated Stephenson as 'Head of British Security Co-ordination' and 
supported measures for sharing intelligence efforts.14 
War had stimulated the advance of British cryptanalysis as dozens 
of mathematicians, lawyers, chess players, and historians joined forces 
to break the German wartime 'Enigma' code. The breaking of codes 
produced by 'Enigma', the German encyphering machine, was the 
responsibility of this varied group of individuals known as 'Ultra'. 
Having broken the German code, the Ultra group intercepted Nazi 
wireless traffic as it was dispatched and read it as quickly as those for 
whom it was intended. As a result, Allied commanders had remarkable 
insight into enemy dispositions and plans. In one case (later well 
publicised), Ultra actually read a German directive before it was read by 
General Rommel, to whom it was addressed.1s 
The development of intelligence continued in the post-war years and 
led to the creation of the US Central Intelligence Agency. The CIA's 
broadened concerns, political, military, social, and economic, to name 
the most notable ones, carried this organisation beyond the earlier 
OSS which was subordinated to the J oint Chiefs of Staff. The CIA 
mandate was oriented toward a general political assignment and thus 
represented an important step in the political evolution of intelligence 
during this period.16 
Such advances did not always mean greater effectiveness, either in 
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satisfying new political demands or in accomplishing military objec-
tives. American experiences in Korea highlighted the problem. The CIA 
failure to assess Chinese intentions in Korea lead to what is generally 
viewed as the major political mistake of the war. Faulty estima.tes of 
North Korean arrangements for the defence of Seoul - mtelligence 
estimates were off by 100% - threatened the prospects for the success 
of the Inchon campaign.17 However the fact is that Korea p:es.ented 
Western forces with an opportunity to develop more sophisticated 
methods for digesting and sifting enormous amounts of intellige~ce 
d t The war in Vietnam added still more to the science of collecting a a. . 
both political and military data. under combat conditions. The mam 
effort was put into the American Phoenix programme. ~t~ough often 
denounced as a simple 'assassination programme', PhoeniX mvolved the 
establishment of District Intelligence Operations Centers in about two-
thirds of the country's 240 districts and in almost all of Vietnam's :-4 
P
rovinces. The objective of Phoenix was to identify CommUnist 
r h" fl 18 
military and political leaders so as to neutra lse t elr m uence .. 
While the reorientation of intelligence objectives was takmg place, 
there was also another dramatic change in intelligence technologies. 
Computers, reconnaissance satellites, and even more 'space-age' inn~­
vations have now allowed machines to replace agents on the ground m 
many cases.19 The advance of technology enabled the intelligence 
operative to find new uses for his product. Global surveillance means 
that the earth's natural resources themselves can now be the target of 
the spy's attentions. Not surprisingly, many intellig~nce functions have 
been converted to commercial uses just as commercial endeavours once 
aided the development of intelligence activities. 
THE SOVIET EXAMPLE: COMBINED OBJECTIVES 
The best example of a reorientation of intelligence objectives is the 
Soviet intelligence system, known as the KGB. It. combines domes~ic 
and international functions with the ability to Unite mtelhgence with 
action. In the broadest sense, the KGB is responsible for monitoring 
the daily lives of Soviet citizens and preventing 'anti-Soviet provoca-
tions'. This task is done by the Second Chief Directorate, a force .of 
several hundred thousand men and women who run the most effective 
control system of any modern industrial state and perform an inva~u­
able political service in helping the Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union maintain power. In addition to this force, there IS a supplemen-
tary informer network which at one time num~ere.d ~ver five million 
unpaid volunteers. This mammoth system made it difficult f~r Western 
intelligence services to place agents on the ground - the United States 
only early warning device against a possible Soviet attack - before the 
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start of U-2 flights and satellite surveillance.2° 
For the KGB, defence of the homeland does not stop at the USSR's 
frontiers. The KGB's First Chief Directorate enables the Kremlin to 
reach beyond Soviet borders to frustrate incipient movements by 
cmigre groups hoping to penetrate the CPSU's empire. The 'Trust 
Operation' of the 1920's demonstrated Soviet capabilities as the 
Kremlin sometimes deceived both British and French intelligence while 
blunting the political threat of the million-strong anti-Soviet emigration 
in the West. After World War Two, Soviet concern for former citizens 
was reflected in the forced repatriation of Soviet nationals left in 
occupied Germany, the KGB's infiltration of the anti-Soviet 'People's 
Labour League' and the large Ukrainian emigration, and the physical 
liquidation of numerous leaders of the Soviet emigration and defectors 
from official USSR services. Although the KGB's Laboratory of Special 
Weapons has devoted considerable energy to the development of the 
'perfect' murder weapon, the West German trial of Bogdan Stashinsky 
in 1962, with its worldwide, sensational reports, and the interests of the 
USSR's image during the years of detente have discouraged direct 
Soviet involvement in so-called 'wet affairs'.2l 
While violent measures against emigres make exciting reading, the 
KGB's political activities had a more significant impact on the inter-
national balance of power. Efforts to utilise espionage and covert 
operations to create distrust among the Western allies have illustrated 
the political utility of the KGB. Much has been written about the career 
of Kim Philby and the operations he directly compromised. Yet, the 
secrets betrayed by Philby also contributed to a loss of mutual confi-
dence by the Western allies. The 1974 case of the GDR agent Guenter 
Guillaume, one of Chancellor Brandt's closest aides, added to this loss 
of trust. The KGB also recruits 'agents of influence', people who serve 
the USSR not by revealing Western secrets but by supporting Soviet 
positions in a public forum. In recent years the Soviet embassy in 
Washington has become active in lobbying Congress by presenting the 
Soviet position on legislative proposals relating to foreign affairs. The 
Soviet techniques are no different from those of countless domestic 
'pressure groups'. Journalists, businessmen, lawyers, and numerous 
professionals can serve as 'agents of influence'. 
Soviet political objectives are also advanced by the deployment of 
Soviet intelligence forces against Western firms dealing in technologies 
that are of military significance. Soviet success in acquiring Western 
technology can be attributed to a blending of legal purchases and illegal 
acquisitions. These efforts are directed by several thousand technology 
collection officers working in Western nations. Open literature, legal 
trade channels, and scientific conferences are the most common legal 
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avenues utilised by the Soviets and their allies. Illegal methods involve 
everything from outright theft to the establishment of firms which pass 
technology directly from the West to Eastern Europe. Over twenty 
firms set up by Soviet and East European agencies operate in the 
United States for this purpose and over 300 similar firms operate in 
Western Europe and Canada. Where they have not set up their own 
firms, Soviet frequently use agents-in-place who will divert important 
technology to the USSR. Among the primary targets of this campaign 
are aerohydrodynamics, cryogenics, optics, lasers, computers, magnetic 
bubble computer memories, microelectronics, structural and electronic 
materials, and general nuclear developments.22 
CONCLUSION 
As this brief examination shows, intelligence has become a general 
political tool rather than simply a military weapon. Gradually, its 
objectives have changed: military concerns have merged into political 
ones. The evolution of intelligence objectives was constant. Advances 
in technology have sometimes masked the direction of this evolution 
as fascination with intelligence techniques obscured the more 
fundamental changes in the use of intelligence. The evolution of intelli-
gence simply matches recognition of the relationship between politics 
and war. War, it is often said, is merely an extension of politics. Thus, 
intelligence objectives must ultimately be political ones because most 
issues - economic, social, or technological - eventually translate them-
selves into political concerns. 
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BOOK NOTICE 
The Dictionary of Essential Quotations by Kevin Goldstein-] ackson 
(Croom Helm, Kent) £12.95. 
A book of 'Essential' Quotations necessarily means that a subjective 
choice has been made. This is no exception; from my own, albeit 
selective dipping, Mr Goldstein-] ackson is cynic first, author second. 
Few of his 'essential' quotations show pleasure. 
Hence 'Joy' is missing altogether and 'Happiness' has rather sad 
quotes like 'A lifetime of happiness; no man alive could bear it· it 
would be hell on earth' (George Bernard Shaw) or even 'We are ne~er 
happy, we can only remember we were so once' (Alexander Smith). 
'Armies' has only three quotations - all by Mao Tse Tung. 'Honour' 
has only three negative references while 'Courage' and 'Defence' 
nothing at all. He cannot find one positive quotation about 
'Democracy' . 
However, there are some pithy and witty words of wisdom in this 
book. The after-dinner speaker, may find inspiration. 
1983.215 x 130711111. 184pp, 14pp index. Hardcover. 
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